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Bank Earnings Smoothing, Audit Quality and Procyclicality in Africa 
The Case of Loan Loss Provisions 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examine whether the way African banks use loan loss provisions to smooth 
earnings is influenced by capital market motivations and the type of auditor after controlling for non-
discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions and fluctuations in the business cycle. The findings 
support the income smoothing hypothesis and indicate that (i) African banks use loan loss provisions 
to smooth reported earnings; (ii) listed African banks use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings to a 
greater extent than non-listed African banks possibly for capital market reasons; (iii) income 
smoothing via loan loss provisions is not reduced among African banks with Big 4 auditor; and (iv) 
bank provisioning in Africa is procyclical with fluctuations in the business cycle. The findings have 
three implications. One, listed African banks smooth income because they are more visible to 
investors and investors do not view stock price fluctuation as a good signal. Securities market 
regulators in African countries should enforce strict disclosure rules that reduce earnings smoothing 
practices in order to improve the transparency of banks’ reported earnings in the region. Two, the 
presence of Big 4 auditor did not improve the informativeness of loan loss provisions estimates 
among African banks. Three, the evidence for procyclical provisioning suggest the need for dynamic 
loan loss provisioning system in Africa. 
JEL: G21, M41, O55, N27. 
Keywords: Loan Loss Provisions; Earnings Management; Dynamic Provisioning; Income Smoothing; 
Audit Quality; Procyclicality; Africa, Banks. Economic Cycles. 
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1. Introduction 
The question whether banks use loan loss provisions (LLP) to manipulate reported earnings is 
examined by a large empirical literature and the literature report mixed conclusions (Ahmed et al, 
1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Anandarajan et al, 2007; Fonseca and 
Gonzalez, 2008; El Sood, 2012; Parker and Zhu, 2012). Some developed country studies examine 
income smoothing practices among banks in US, Europe, Australia and Asia (see. El Sood, 2012; 
Leventis et al, 2011; Ozili, 2017; Anandarajan et al, 2007; Parker and Zhu, 2012), while related 
studies examine other cross-country contexts (e.g. Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Fonseca and 
Gonzalez, 2008). Recently, few studies in Africa have emerged and focus on provisions-based 
earnings smoothing in a single country context (see. Ahmed et al, 2014; Ozili, 2015). To date, there is 
little knowledge about provisions-based earnings smoothing practices across African countries. In this 
paper, we undertake a cross-country analysis of income smoothing via loan loss provisions for 
African banks. One merit of country-specific studies is that it takes into account the fact that banks 
across African countries face unique conditions and have dissimilar rules regarding the accounting for 
loan loss provisions compared to banking institutions in US and Europe. However, it is common 
practice to investigate whether banks in a region exhibit similar financial reporting behavior with a 
focus on banks’ earnings smoothing behavior. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether African banks use loan loss provisions to smooth 
bank earnings and whether this behavior is influenced by the type of bank auditor and whether the 
bank is listed or non-listed. Evidence for the use of loan loss provisions to smooth income derives 
from the positive and significant relation between loan loss provisions and pre-provisions earnings in 
the literature. By dividing African banks into listed and non-listed category, the main argument is that 
African banks driven by capital market considerations will use loan loss provisions to smooth 
earnings possibly to minimize stock price fluctuations. With respect to the type of auditor, the main 
argument is that the presence of Big 4 auditor in a bank reflects superior audit quality and should 
deter earnings smoothing practices.  
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For the purpose of this paper, earnings smoothing is a form of earnings management behavior because 
it convey the idea that banks have incentives to lower too high earnings and to increase too low 
earnings. We focus on the use of loan loss provisions to smooth bank earnings because prior studies 
identify loan loss provisions to be an important earnings smoothing tool in the banking industry due to 
its direct impact on bank net interest margin and its role in bank credit risk management (Wall and 
Koch, 2000). The findings indicate that listed African banks significantly use loan loss provisions to 
smooth income. Also, the findings indicate that African banks audited by Big 4 auditor use loan loss 
provisions to smooth earnings more than African banks audited by non-Big 4 auditor, and imply that 
the presence of Big 4 auditor, often associated with superior audit quality, did not discourage the use 
of loan loss provisions to smooth income, and suggests that the presence of Big 4 auditor does not 
improve the informativeness or reliability of loan loss provisions estimates among African banks. 
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, the findings in the paper contribute to the 
bank earning management literature. The study provides the first cross-country evidence on earnings 
smoothing via loan loss provisions across a large sample of 302 African banks. By providing evidence 
that African banks smooth income, the finding suggests that provisions-based earnings smoothing 
practice of banks is a widespread earnings management practice across the globe, even in Africa. 
Second, the findings in this paper contribute to the debate on procyclical and countercyclical 
(dynamic) provisioning in the banking literature. Our evidence for procyclical provisioning behavior 
among African bank supports the debate to adopt a dynamic loan loss provisioning. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection criteria and methodology. Section 4 reports the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes. The term ‘income smoothing’ and ‘earnings smoothing’ are 
used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1. Income Smoothing Hypothesis 
Income smoothing involves minimizing the fluctuation of reported earnings over time. The income 
smoothing hypothesis argue that banks decrease high earnings in good years and increase low 
earnings in bad years to report stable earnings over time (Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988). An extensive 
literature document evidence that bank managers use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings (e.g. 
Leventis et al, 2011; El Sood, 2012; Ozili, 2017). Some cross-country studies also document evidence 
that banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income after controlling for country-level differences 
(e.g. Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Parker and Zhu, 2012). For instance, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) 
examine income smoothing practices among banks across 41 countries and find that income 
smoothing behavior decreases among banks in countries with strong investor protection, accounting 
disclosure, restrictions on bank activities, official and private supervision. In addition, they find that 
provisions-based income smoothing increases with market-orientation and financial system 
development. Leventis et al (2011) examine provisioning practices among 91 listed European banks 
and find evidence for income smoothing among European banks and the income smoothing behavior 
is significantly reduced after mandatory IFRS adoption. Similar studies also examine bank income 
smoothing practices in Asia (Parker and Zhu, 2012) and in emerging European countries (Bonin and 
Kosak, 2013) and find evidence for income smoothing. Jointly, the above studies draw inference 
based on the statistical relation between provisions and earnings before tax and provisions. While a 
positive and significant coefficient for the earnings before tax and provisions variable is indicative of 
income smoothing, it is unknown whether similar or conflicting evidence may be found among 
African banks. 
Few African studies examine income smoothing practices in a single country context (e.g. Ahmed et 
al, 2014; Yahaya et al, 2015; Ozili, 2015). Ahmed et al (2014) examine earnings management through 
the use of loan loss provision among deposit money banks in Nigeria and find evidence that loan loss 
provisions is used to manage earnings. Ozili (2015) examine the income smoothing behavior of listed 
Nigerian banks during the voluntary IFRS adoption period and document evidence for income 
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smoothing among listed banks in Nigeria. In contrast, Yahaya et al (2015) investigate the effect of 
IFRS adoption on earnings management behavior of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. They 
focus their study on how the change in the recognition and measurement of banks’ loan loss provision 
affects earnings management behavior. They did not find a significant difference in the earnings 
management behavior of banks in the post-IFRS period relative to the pre-IFRS. The present study 
extends this growing strand of literature by investigating bank income smoothing practices for a wide 
sample of African countries while controlling for other influences on bank provisioning behavior.  
2.2. Capital Market Motivations 
There is the argument that banks smooth earnings because smoothed earnings reduce the variability of 
earnings which further translate into reduced stock price volatility. Anandarajan et al (2007) 
demonstrate that if smoothed earnings reduce stock price fluctuation, then listed banks will have some 
incentive to smooth income to minimize stock price fluctuation and the volatility of stock return. This 
view argues that existing and potential investors view stable stock price as a good signal for high 
stock return, which in turn create incentives for managers of listed banks to smooth earnings to 
stabilize share prices. Anandarajan et al (2007) in their study compare the provisions-based income 
smoothing behavior of listed banks and non-listed banks in Australia. They find evidence that listed 
Australian banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income more than non-listed Australian banks, 
and conclude that listed Australian banks use provisions to smooth income for capital market reasons. 
Similarly, Leventis et al (2011) examine the case of listed European banks across 18 countries during 
the 1999 to 2008 period and document evidence that listed EU banks use provisions to smooth income 
but the income smoothing behavior is significantly reduced in the post mandatory IFRS period. Both 
study use bank earnings rather than stock returns to test for capital market motivations. With respect 
to African banks, Ozili (2015) examine listed banks in Nigeria and find evidence for income 
smoothing via provisions. To date, there is yet no cross-country evidence that examine whether, or 
not, listed African banks use provisions to smooth earnings relative to non-listed African banks. 
Therefore, this paper also tests whether listed African banks and non-listed African banks exhibit a 
significant difference in their provisions-based income smoothing behavior. Consistent with the above 
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argument, the prediction is that listed African banks will use provisions to smooth income more 
aggressively than non-listed African banks. 
2.3. Auditor Choice  
A firm would choose the services of a Big 4 auditor than non-Big 4 auditor if they believe that the 
reputation of Big 4 auditors reflect superior audit quality (Blackwell et al, 1998). Teoh and Wong 
(1993) and Francis et al (1999) document evidence that investors perceive reported earnings to be of 
higher quality when the firm’s auditor is a Big 5 auditor. Their findings are consistent with the 
argument of DeAngelo (1981) who argue that Big 5 auditors are able to detect material misstatements 
in financial statements and are more willing to report what they find relative to non-Big 5 auditors. 
More importantly, the type of auditor of a firm is considered to be important for industries where 
information uncertainty is higher relative to other industries (Billingsley and Schneller, 2009). For 
instance, the complexity of banking operations and the difficulty to assess the risk of large loan 
portfolio further contribute to widen the information asymmetry problem between bank owners and 
managers. Hence, to ensure that managers disclose decision-useful and sufficient information to bank 
owners, shareholders (or board of directors) are more likely to insist on the need to employ the 
services of Big 4 auditors with the expectation of superior audit quality (Kanagaretnam et al, 2010). 
Kanagaretnam et al (2010) show that the presence of Big 4 auditor moderates the extent of bank 
income smoothing via loan loss provisions, that is, income smoothing is not significantly pronounced 
or reduced. Following the above argument, the prediction is that there will be less income smoothing 
behavior among African banks with Big 4 auditor relative to African banks with non-Big 4 auditor. 
2.4. Procyclicality 
The behavior of bank provisions is often considered to reinforce the current state of the business 
cycle, implying that bank loan loss provisions exhibits procyclical behavior (Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). During economic upturns (or economic boom), banks report 
fewer problem loans and the level of provisions is usually low. Conversely, during economic 
downturns provisions increase because expected loan defaults are high and the size of provisions is 
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expected to significantly increase if a recession persist (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). However, 
there is evidence that banks have incentives to overstate provisions (rather than lower provisions) 
during economic booms in order to lower too high profit that might attract scrutiny from regulators. 
Liu and Ryan (2006) observe that more profitable banks increase loan loss provisions to lower too 
high earnings during the 1990 economic boom while El Sood (2012) find that banks increase loan loss 
provisions to smooth income downwards when they are more profitable and when they are in non-
recessionary periods. Consistent with these studies, real gross domestic product growth rate is used to 
control for fluctuation in the business cycle. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data and Sample Selection Criteria 
Pooled cross-section and time-series bank income statement and balance sheet data is obtained for 19 
economies in Africa: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroun, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and 
Zambia. The sample period cover 2004 to 2013 and is sufficient to cover a full economic cycle (i.e., a 
10-year period). Bank-level balance sheet and income statement data is obtained from Van Dijk 
Bankscope database while macroeconomic data on real gross domestic product growth rate for each 
jurisdiction is obtained from the World Economic Forum archived in World Bank database. 
Description of variables and data source is presented in Table 1A. 
[Insert Table 1A] 
Data was obtained for 347 banks from Bankscope database. To clean up the data, African banks with 
observations for crucial variables (e.g. loan loss provisions, earnings, etc.) for less than three 
consecutive years were excluded to control for the quality of bank reporting. 45 African banks were 
excluded that did not report data for crucial variables. The sample is then reduced to 302 banks. 
Second, extreme outliners in the observations for the remaining 302 banks are eliminated (e.g. loan 
growth above 99% and tier 1 Capital above 50%) to minimize measurement bias commonly 
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associated with outliers. Third, 2008 bank-year observations were not eliminated to control for the 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis.2 The final data distribution is an unbalanced panel because some 
African banks have missing observations. The resulting final sample yields 302 African banks that 
provide data on loan loss provisions and other crucial variables for 10 years (2004 to 2013). Finally, a 
distinction is made between listed and non-listed banks, and banks with and without Big 4 auditor. Of 
the 302 African banks, 74 are listed banks and 228 are non-listed banks. Of the 74 listed banks, 50 
listed banks are audited by Big 4 auditor while 24 are audited by non-Big 4 auditor. Of the 228 non-
listed African banks, 129 non-listed banks have Big 4 auditor and 99 non-listed banks have non-Big 4 
auditor. See Table 1B for data distribution. 
[Insert Table 1B] 
3.2. Methodology 
To test the propensity to use provisions to smooth earnings, the baseline model specification is given 
by: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 
+  𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +  𝐵𝐼𝐺4 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖 +  𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝐵𝐼𝐺4 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷
∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
LLP is the ratio of loan loss provision to bank total asset. EBTP is the ratio of earnings before taxes 
and provisions to total asset. LOAN is the change in gross loan outstanding. NPL is the ratio of non-
performing loans to gross loan. CAR is the ratio of Tier 1 bank capital to risk-weighted assets. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of bank total assets. CFEER is the ratio of net commission and fee income to 
total asset. ΔGDP is the real gross domestic product growth rate.  
The model estimates the propensity to use loan loss provisions to smooth income after controlling for 
differences in nonperforming loans, loan growth, tier 1 capital ratio, size, commission and fee income 
                                                          
2 At the time of the 2008 global financial crisis, banks in African were not systemically integrated with the 
global financial system, hence, there is no reason to believe that balance sheet of most African banks were 
adversely affected by the 2008 global financial crisis.  
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and gross domestic product growth rate. The model is estimated using panel least square with White’s 
robust standard error correction, as well as, with and without period fixed effect. 
The income smoothing variable of interest is EBTP. A positive sign on EBTP coefficient is indicative 
of bank income smoothing via loan loss provisions. Loan growth (LOAN) is a proxy for 
contemporaneous credit risk (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). A positive sign on LOAN coefficient 
indicates that loan loss provisions increases as loan supply increases due to contemporaneous credit 
risk concerns. However, Lobo and Yang (2001) point out that a negative relation may be expected if 
banks lower provisions due to improved quality of incremental loans. Non-performing loans (NPL) 
capture the riskiness of bank loan portfolio. A positive sign on the NPL coefficient is predicted 
because banks will increase provision when they expect loan defaults (Beaver and Engel, 1996).  
CAR is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, and control for the use of provisions to 
manage regulatory capital (e.g. Kilic et al, 2012; Bonin and Kosak, 2013). The capital management 
hypothesis argues that banks are more likely to use discretionary provisions to increase regulatory 
capital levels to avoid the costs associated with violating minimum regulatory capital requirements 
(Ahmed et al, 1999). Consistent with Kilic et al (2012) and Bonin and Kosak (2013), a negative sign 
on CAR coefficient is expected.  
The use of the natural logarithm of total asset (SIZE) as a proxy for bank size is consistent with Kilic 
et al (2012) and Ozili (2015). Large banks are considered to have higher levels of business activities 
and may set aside higher provisions to commensurate for their high business levels relative to smaller 
banks, hence, a positive sign on SIZE coefficient is expected (Anandarajan et al, 2007).  
Hasan and Hunter (1994) suggest that higher fees and commission income (CFEER) for banks may 
indicate an interest in non-depository banking activities and banks may allocate additional reserves (or 
provisions) to mitigate risk arising from providing multiple services that are non-depository in nature. 
Following this reasoning, a positive sign is expected on the CFEER coefficient. 
At country level, real gross domestic product growth rate (ΔGDP) control for provisioning that 
depend on the state of the economic cycle (Leaven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 
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2005). BIG4 dummy variable take the value of ‘1’ for African banks with Big 4 auditor and ‘0’ for 
African banks with non-Big 4 auditor. LISTED dummy variable take the value of ‘1’ if the bank is 
listed and ‘0’ otherwise.  
Finally, to test the influence of bank-type on income smoothing behavior among African banks, each 
bank-type dummy is interacted with the bank income smoothing variable. The coefficients of each 
interaction term measure the influence of the bank-type on provisions-based income smoothing 
among African banks. The incorporation of interaction terms is the main rationale for using separate 
regressions rather than a single regression with sandwiched variables. 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2A&B report the summary of the descriptive statistics. In Table 2A, LLPs average 0.9% of total 
assets. Banks in Nigeria report the highest provisions while Botswana, Namibia, Kenya3, Uganda and 
Mauritius report lower LLPs. NPL averages 7.89% of gross loan, and is higher for banks in North 
African countries (e.g. Egypt 14.07% and Tunisia 15.01%). Loan growth (LOAN) is about 19.2%, but 
exhibits substantial cross-country differences. For instance, loan growth rates are much lower in 
Egypt and much higher in Ghana and Angola while other countries experience a double-digit increase 
in gross loans over the sample period. ΔGDP, on average, is about 5.7% and much lower for Algeria 
and higher for Ethiopia. CFEER is higher for banks in Zambia, South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana but 
lower for banks in Morocco and Tunisia. For banks in countries that report Tier 1 capital ratio (CAR), 
banks in Angola, Nigeria and Uganda report higher CAR compared to banks in Morocco and Namibia 
that report much lower CAR.  
                                                          
3 The low LLPs for Kenyan banking industry is not surprising as the IMF recently released a statement to 
confirm that Kenyan banks allocated too low provision for bad debts that were insufficient to cover the 
mounting bad debts in the country’s banking system. (See:  http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/IMF-says-
Kenyan-banks-exposed-to-bad-loans-danger/-/539552/2613532/-/apcc8h/-/index.html) 
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For listed and non-listed banks in Table 2B, the mean value of LLPs is 1%, respectively, and suggests 
that there is no significant difference in LLPs for listed and non-listed African banks. NPLs are, on 
average, 7.55% and 8.03% of gross loan for listed and non-listed African banks, respectively; and 
indicate that listed African banks report lower NPLs than non-listed African banks. This implies that 
listed African banks have better asset quality compared to non-listed African banks and also reflect 
superior credit risk management practices by listed African banks. With respect to CAR, listed 
African banks record lower CAR compared to non-listed African banks. Also, LOAN is lower for 
listed African banks compared to non-listed African banks. Also, listed African banks have higher 
total assets (SIZE) relative to non-listed African banks, and suggest that larger African banks are more 
likely to have their shares listed on a recognized stock exchange, compared to smaller African banks. 
On average, CFEER is 2% for both banks and suggest that both banks have similar incentive to 
engage in non-depository activities. Finally, the difference of means between listed African banks and 
non-listed African banks is low and SIZE has the highest mean difference indicating that listed banks 
are larger than non-listed African banks.  
For the Big 4 and non-Big 4 category, the mean value of LLP is 1%, respectively; and suggests that 
there is no significant difference in LLPs for both banks. NPLs are, on average, 7.27% and 9.19%, 
and indicate that banks with Big 4 auditors report lower NPLs than banks with non-Big 4 auditor.  
Also, banks with Big 4 auditor record lower CAR compared to banks with non-Big 4 auditor. Also, 
LOAN is lower for banks with Big 4 auditor. Also, total assets (SIZE) are marginally higher for banks 
with Big 4 auditor compared to banks with non-Big 4, and suggest that large African banks are more 
likely to employ the services of a Big 4 auditor compared to smaller African banks. CFEER is higher 
for banks with Big 4 auditor and imply that banks with Big 4 auditor have higher interest in non-
depository activities compared to banks with non-Big 4 auditor. Finally, the difference of means for 
EBTP and LLP variables are sufficiently low (i.e., about 1% for EBTP and 0% for LLP) for both bank 
categories and implies that the average values do not convey much difference in the earnings and 
provisions estimates of the two bank categories. 
 [Insert Table 2A&B here] 
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4.2. Correlations 
Table 3A reports the Pearson correlation coefficients and the associated p-values for the full sample. 
LLPs are positive and significantly correlated to bank earnings, EBTP (0.454***) among African 
banks. LLPs are positive and weakly correlated with SIZE (-0.008) and suggest that provisions 
decrease as the size of banks increase. Nonetheless, the correlation coefficient is not significant. LLPs 
are negative and significantly correlated with ΔGDP (-0.088**), indicating that provisioning among 
African banks is procyclical with fluctuations in the business cycle. LLPs are significantly correlated 
with NPLs and indicate that provisions increase as credit risk increases. LOAN is positive and 
significant at 10% level, and suggest that African banks’ provisions are positively correlated with 
contemporaneous credit risk. CAR is positively correlated with LLPs and indicate that provisions 
increase as Tier 1 capital increase among African banks. LISTED and BIG4 are positive and weakly 
correlated with LLPs. Overall, the correlation coefficients in Panel A are sufficiently low, and suggest 
that multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis. In Table 3B, the correlation coefficient of interest 
is EBTP. LLPs are positively correlated with EBTP for Big 4, non-Big 4, listed and non-listed bank 
categories. The correlation of LLP with EBTP is higher for listed banks (74.5%) compared to non-
listed banks (24.8%), and higher for banks with Big 4 auditor (48.8%) compared to banks with non-
Big 4 auditor (8.4%). This indicates that provisions increase as earnings increase, particularly, for 
listed African banks and banks with Big 4 auditor. 
[Insert Table 3A&B here] 
4.3. Income Smoothing 
4.3.1. Main Result: Full Sample 
Table 4 reports the main results. EBTP coefficient reports a positive and significant sign at the 1% 
level in Column 1, indicating that African banks use provisions to smooth bank earnings during the 
period of analysis. This is consistent with Anandarajan et al (2007) and Ozili (2015, 2017), and 
implies that African banks increase provisions estimates to lower high earnings and report lower 
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provisions estimates to increase low earnings. For the control variables, NPL, SIZE, LOAN, CFEER 
and CAR coefficients report the expected signs. The positive and significant sign for NPL coefficient 
indicate that African banks increase provisions when they expect increase in loan defaults. The 
positive and significant sign on CFEER coefficient indicate that African banks that have an interest in 
non-depository activities will keep more provisions to cover risk arising from engaging in non-
depository activities. The negative and significant sign on CAR coefficient indicate that African use 
provisions to manage Tier 1 capital levels. Also, ΔGDP coefficient reports a negative and significant 
sign, indicating that provisioning by African banks is procyclical with fluctuation in the business 
cycle. Overall, the coefficient signs are consistent with theoretical expectations. 
4.3.2. Listed vs Non-Listed Banks 
EBTP is interacted with LISTED dummy variable in Column 2 of Table 4. LISTED*EBTP 
coefficient reports a positive and significant sign at the 10% level, indicating that income smoothing 
via provisions is more pronounced among listed African banks compared to non-listed African banks. 
Anandarajan et al (2007) and Leventis et al (2011) find similar evidence for listed banks in Australia 
and Europe, respectively. LISTED coefficient reports a negative and significant sign at 1% level, and 
implies that listed African banks report fewer provisions compared to non-listed African banks. 
4.3.3. Audit Quality 
BIG4*EBTP coefficient measure whether the use of provisions to smooth income is significantly 
associated with African banks with Big 4 auditor relative to African banks with non-Big 4 auditor. 
BIG4*EBTP coefficient reports a positive and insignificant sign in Column 3 of Table 4, and 
indicates that the presence of Big 4 auditor did not discourage bank income smoothing via loan loss 
provisions. This finding is consistent with Kanagaretnam et al (2010). There are possible explanations 
for this. One, because Africa is a new client base for Big 4 auditors who seek to penetrate the audit 
services market by obtaining new bank clients and/or retaining existing bank clients during the period 
of analysis, Big 4 auditors may have less incentive to provide high-quality audit that discourage 
banks’ manipulation of loan loss provisions estimate to smooth or manage income during the period 
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to avoid losing bank clients. Two, the presence of other auditors “affiliated” with Big 4 auditors who 
provide less-than-superior audit services may be responsible for the weak impact of Big 4 audit 
quality on bank provisions-based earnings smoothing. African banks may be more willing to pay the 
lower fee charged by auditors affiliated with Big 4 auditors than to pay high fees to Big 4 audit firms. 
Three, the existence of weak bank supervision and legal enforcement institutions in the region might 
also create weak incentive for Big 4 auditors to provide superior audit quality for banks in the region 
so as to retain their bank clients who pay for the favorable audit services offered to them. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis: 
4.4.1. Sub-Sample 
The full sample is divided into four subsamples to check whether the main result (Table 4) is sensitive 
to sub-sample bank category. EBTP is the variable of interest and Table 5 report the results. EBTP 
coefficient is positive and significant at 1% level in Column 1 of Table 5, indicating that African 
banks use provisions to smooth earnings for capital market reasons. This confirms the earlier result 
and is consistent with the argument of Anandarajan et al (2007). On the other hand, EBTP coefficient 
is not significant for non-listed African banks in Column 2 of Table 5. This indicates that income 
smoothing via provisions is not significantly associated with non-listed African banks. Overall, this 
confirms the earlier result (see Table 4) that bank income smoothing via provisions is more 
pronounced among listed banks compared to non-listed banks. For African banks with Big 4 auditor, 
EBTP coefficient is positive and significant at 1% level in Column 3 of Table 5, and imply that bank 
income smoothing is pronounced among African banks with Big 4 auditor compared to African banks 
with non-Big 4 auditor. On the other hand, EBTP coefficient is positive but not significant for African 
banks with non-Big 4 auditor in Column 4 of Table 5. Overall, the results confirm the earlier results 
that the presence of Big 4 auditors did not discourage or reduce the extent of bank income smoothing 
among African banks 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
16 
 
4.4.2. Additional Checks 
Next, we adjust the analysis to take into account bank-type complementarity. A bank may be listed (or 
non-listed) and have a Big 4 (or non-Big 4) auditor. In our sample, some listed and non-listed banks 
have Big 4 auditor while other listed and non-listed banks have non-Big 4 auditor. To account for this 
complementarity, each subsample is examined separately and a binary dummy variable is used to 
capture whether each sub-sample has the property of another sub-sample. For instance, in the listed 
African bank subsample, listed banks that have Big 4 auditor take the value 1 and listed banks with 
non-Big 4 auditor take the value ‘0’. The same procedure is applied to the non-listed bank subsample. 
In the Big 4 subsample, banks that are also listed take the value ‘1’ and banks that are not listed take 
the value ‘0’. The sample procedure is applied to the non-Big 4 subsample. The variables of interest 
are the interaction variables in each subsample. The results are reported in Table 6. LISTED*EBTP 
and BIG4*EBTP coefficients are statistically insignificant. The result does not confirm earlier result 
in Table 4. Additionally, Column 4 of Table 4 use two-way interaction terms based on the full sample.  
The two-way interaction term, LISTED*BIG4*EBTP measure whether provisions-based income 
smoothing is significantly associated with African banks that are listed and have Big 4 auditors 
relative to African banks that are non-listed and without Big 4 auditor. LISTED*BIG4*EBTP 
coefficient is insignificant sign. Overall, this suggests that the results are not sensitive to whether 
African banks in the sample are jointly listed and have a Big 4 auditor. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.4.3. Country-Specific Regression 
Further, we recognize the bias associated with cross-country analysis because it fails to take into 
account national characteristics that might affect bank provisions-based income smoothing practices. 
Thus, we run additional country-specific regression to minimize this bias. The result is reported in 
Table 6. After applying White’s robust standard error correction, cross-country variations in 
provisions-based income smoothing can be observed. However, the reported sign for EBTP for most 
countries is positive and consistent with the prediction. Only few countries report a negative sign. 
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Also, there is evidence of provisions-based earnings smoothing among banks in Uganda, Morocco, 
Namibia, Senegal, Cameroun, and Ethiopia, while there is no evidence of provisions-based income 
smoothing practices in other African countries in our sample. The positive but insignificant sign on 
EBTP coefficient for some countries might be due to the small number of sample banks in the country 
analysis.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper explores the use of discretionary provisions to smooth earnings by African banks after 
controlling for non-discretionary provisions and macroeconomic fluctuation. Using a sample of 302 
banks from 19 countries, the findings are consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. The 
findings indicate that African banks use provisions to smooth earnings. Also, the finding indicate that 
listed African banks use provisions to smooth income compared to non-listed African banks. The 
findings also suggest that the presence of Big 4 auditors did not discourage income smoothing via 
provisions among African banks with Big 4 auditor, and suggest that the presence of Big 4 auditor did 
not improve the informativeness of bank loan loss provisions estimates. After controlling for 
macroeconomic fluctuation, there is also evidence that provisioning is procyclical with fluctuations in 
the business cycle. Finally, there is evidence of cross-country variation in the use of provisions to 
smooth earnings. 
The main message (and implication) of the findings in this paper are three-fold. First, the practice of 
provisions-based income smoothing is wide spread even among African banks. Second, the evidence 
for procyclical provisioning suggest that macro-prudential regulators in the African region should 
seek ways to reduce the cyclicality of loan loss provisions in the region possibly by adopting a 
dynamic loan loss provisioning system. Third, this study adds new evidence to the literature on audit 
quality by showing that earnings smoothing via provisions among African banks is not significantly 
reduced by the presence of Big 4 auditor. Because the type of auditor is employed as a proxy for audit 
18 
 
quality in our study, the implication is that the choice of auditor (in this case, Big 4 auditor or non-Big 
4 auditor) does not improve the reliability or informativeness of loan loss provisions estimates and the 
quality of earnings in the region. Contrary to popular understanding that having a Big 4 auditor is a 
necessary condition to improve overall earnings quality among firms in the region, the findings in this 
paper show that this is not the case. Accordingly, a natural follow-up question for future research 
could be to examine whether the quality of bank provisions estimates and bank earnings among Big 4 
auditor banks in the African region improves in environments with strong bank regulatory and 
supervisory institutions. Another interesting question for future research could be to investigate 
whether African banks audited by Big 4 auditors engage less aggressively in provisions-based 
earnings management when they are in environments or countries with strong legal and investor 
protection institutions. 
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Tables 
 
Panel 1A: Data Source and Description 
Variables Description Data Source 
LLP Bank loan loss provision to bank total asset Bankscope database 
EBTP Loan loss provisions added back to profit before tax divided by 
total asset. 
Bankscope database 
NPL Ratio of bank non-performing loans to gross loan. Bankscope database 
LOAN Percentage change in gross loan outstanding Bankscope database 
CFEER Net commission and fee income to total asset ratio. Net 
commission and fee income is commission and fee revenue 
minus commission and fee expense 
Bankscope database 
SIZE Natural logarithm of bank total assets. Bankscope database 
ΔGDP Real gross domestic product growth rate. World Bank database 
CAR Ratio of Tier 1 bank capital to risk-weighted assets. Bankscope database 
LISTED Bankscope database provides information on whether a bank is 
listed or unlisted (or non-listed). 
Bankscope database 
BIG4 Bankscope database provides information on type of auditor of 
a bank. 
Bankscope database 
 
 
Panel 1B: Summary of Data Distribution  
Bank Full 
Sample 
Listed Banks Non-listed 
Banks 
Big 4 Bank Non-Big 4 
Bank 
Number of Banks 347 - - - - 
Less: Banks with 
missing crucial 
variables 
(45) - - - - 
Final Sample: 302 74 228 179 123 
Bank Category Matrix: 
Listed Banks - - - 50 24 
Non-listed Banks - - - 129 99 
Country- Specific Bank Category: 
Country Listed 
Banks 
Non-listed 
Banks 
Big 4 Bank Non-Big 4 
Bank 
# Banks 
Algeria 1 15 1 15 16 
Angola 0 14 10 4 14 
Botswana 4 8 12 0 12 
Cameroun 0 11 5 6 11 
Egypt 10 6 9 7 16 
Ethiopia 0 12 0 12 12 
Ghana 4 11 13 2 15 
Kenya 8 16 20 4 24 
Mauritius 0 15 10 5 15 
Morocco 5 13 7 11 18 
Namibia 2 8 9 1 10 
Nigeria 10 6 13 3 16 
Senegal 1 9 1 9 10 
South Africa 9 20 23 6 29 
Tanzania 0 16 12 4 16 
Togo 1 6 2 5 7 
Tunisia 14 12 3 23 26 
Uganda 3 18 16 5 21 
Zambia 2 12 13 1 14 
Total 74 228 179 123  
Big 4 bank = African banks with Big 4 auditor. Non-Big 4 bank = African banks with non-Big 4 auditor. 
The bank category matrix reflect the number of banks that are (i) listed and also have a Big 4 auditor, (ii) 
listed and have a non-Big 4 auditor, (iii) non-listed and have a Big 4 auditor, and (iv) non-listed and 
have a non-Big 4 auditor.   
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Table 2A: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2a reports the descriptive statistics obtained from 302 sample banks from 19 countries. Data cover the period 
2004-2013. All variables remain as previously defined. The variables of interest are LLP and EBTP. 
Country Mean 
 LLP 
Mean 
EBTP 
Mean 
LOAN 
Mean 
NPL 
Mean 
SIZE 
Mean 
CAR 
Mean 
SIZE 
Mean 
CFEER 
Mean 
ΔGDP 
# 
Banks 
Algeria 0.003 0.028 19.377 5.751 14.171 - 14.171 0.017 3.140 16 
Angola 0.008 0.036 33.346 5.734 13.847 21.800 13.847 0.014 10.798 14 
Botswana 0.002 0.057 22.539 9.257 12.879 13.726 12.879 0.015 7.596 12 
Cameroun 0.004 0.026 12.240 8.152 12.899 - 12.899 0.017 3.485 11 
Egypt 0.006 0.024 9.446 14.071 14.911 18.558 14.911 0.013 4.522 16 
Ethiopia 0.004 0.041 25.690 7.000 13.093 - 13.093 0.013 11.014 12 
Ghana 0.003 0.045 31.044 10.202 13.121 17.145 13.121 0.027 7.432 15 
Kenya 0.0003 0.034 22.589 10.183 12.466 19.037 12.466 0.018 5.242 24 
Mauritius 0.002 0.015 12.393 4.183 13.496 13.205 13.496 0.006 3.977 15 
Morocco 0.003 0.028 11.267 5.182 15.497 11.618 15.497 0.005 4.427 18 
Namibia 0.002 0.035 14.496 2.987 13.743 11.432 13.743 0.018 5.284 10 
Nigeria 0.010 0.032 20.071 4.919 15.557 20.671 15.557 0.022 8.782 16 
Senegal 0.006 0.019 15.479 7.312 12.703 - 12.703 0.015 3.828 10 
South Africa 0.004 0.048 16.951 7.749 14.887 15.849 14.887 0.032 3.281 29 
Tanzania 0.007 0.024 26.438 4.060 12.212 15.566 12.212 0.019 6.674 16 
Togo 0.008 0.025 23.641 10.911 12.413 17.348 12.413 0.017 3.529 7 
Tunisia 0.008 0.023  12.655 15.104 13.263 16.379 13.263 0.007 4.049 26 
Uganda 0.002 0.033 21.445 3.711 11.991 21.155 11.991 0.025 7.070 21 
Zambia 0.006 0.021 28.968 9.143 11.786 16.767 11.786 0.034 7.759 14 
           
Total          302 
Mean 0.009 0.032 19.206 7.899 13.454 19.059 13.454 0.017 5.741  
Median 0.005 0.027 15.750 4.940 13.216 15.375 13.216 0.013 5.170  
Standard 
Deviation 
0.019 0.034 23.739 9.779 1.909 11.635 1.909 0.020 3.906  
Observations 2435 2433 2317 1620 2572 1022 2572 2440 3017  
 
 
Table 2B: Descriptive Statistics: Bank Sub-Sample 
Table 2b reports the mean, standard deviation (in parenthesis) and the arithmetic difference of means. All variables 
remain as previously defined. The variables of interest are LLP and EBTP. 
Variable Listed Banks Non listed 
Banks 
Difference of 
Mean** 
Big 4 Banks Non-Big 4 
Banks 
Difference 
of Mean** 
LLP 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
EBTP 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
LOAN 17.31 
(19.55) 
19.82 
(24.91) 
-2.51 20.87 
(24.17) 
16.79 
(22.73) 
4.08 
NPL 7.55 
(8.88) 
8.03 
(10.11) 
-0.48 7.27 
(9.64) 
9.19 
(9.93) 
-1.92 
CAR 16.83 
(7.22) 
17.10 
(9.27) 
-0.27 16.77 
(8.48) 
17.93 
(9.57) 
-1.18 
SIZE 14.51 
(1.70) 
13.09 
(1.84) 
1.42 13.48 
(2.01) 
13.41 
(1.75) 
0.07 
CFEER 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
No of Banks 74 228  179 123  
**Difference of mean = This is the arithmetic difference of means  
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Table 3A: Full Sample Correlation Matrix 
Panel A report the correlation matrix. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. LLP is loan loss 
provision. EBTP is earnings before taxes and provisions to total asset ratio. CFEER is net commission and fee income to total asset ratio. 
LOAN is the change in gross loan outstanding. NPL is non-performing loan to gross loan. CAR is Tier 1 capital ratio to risk-weighted assets. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total asset. ΔGDP is gross domestic product growth rate. LISTED take the value ‘1’ if the bank is listed and 
‘0’ otherwise. BIG4 take the value ‘1’ if the bank is audited by a Big 4 auditor, otherwise, ‘0’. 
           
           
Variable LLP NPL LOAN CFEER EBTP ΔGDP SIZE CAR BIG4 LISTED 
LLP 1.000          
           
           
NPL 0.391*** 1.000         
 0.000          
           
LOAN 0.063* -0.122*** 1.000        
 0.072 0.000         
           
CFEER 0.468*** 0.078** 0.160*** 1.000       
 0.000 0.026 0.000        
           
EBTP 0.454*** 0.056 0.137*** 0.455*** 1.000      
 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000       
           
ΔGDP -0.088** -0.057 0.257*** -0.006 0.019 1.000     
 0.012 0.104 0.000 0.862 0.570      
           
SIZE -0.008 -0.115*** -0.219*** -0.077** 0.087** -0.282*** 1.000    
 0.825 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.013 0.000     
           
CAR 0.149*** 0.0499 0.102*** 0.271*** 0.251*** 0.089** -0.251*** 1.000   
 0.000 0.156 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000    
           
BIG4 0.053 -0.073** 0.002 0.175*** 0.102*** 0.048 0.221*** -0.053 1.000  
 0.130 0.039 0.965 0.000 0.004 0.173 0.000 0.131   
           
LISTED 0.051 0.014 -0.053 0.104*** 0.258*** -0.099*** 0.408*** 0.009 0.119*** 1.000 
 0.148 0.686 0.128 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.789 0.001  
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Table 3B: Correlation Matrix 
LLP is loan loss provision. NPL is non-performing loans. EBTP is earnings before taxes and provisions. LOAN is the change in 
gross loan. CAR is Tier 1 capital ratio. CFEER is net commission and fee income. ΔGDP is gross domestic product growth rate. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of bank total asset. 
Bank/Variable LLP LOAN SIZE CAR CFEER EBTP ΔGDP NPL 
Listed Banks         
LLP 1.000 
 
       
LOAN 0.217*** 
(0.000) 
1.000       
SIZE -0.082 
(0.188) 
-0.243*** 
(0.000) 
1.000      
CAR 0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.181*** 
(0.004) 
-0.305*** 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFEER 0.529*** 
(0.000) 
0.216*** 
(0.001) 
-0.145** 
(0.019) 
0.527** 
(0.019) 
1.000 
 
   
EBTP 0.745*** 
(0.000) 
0.329*** 
(0.000) 
-0.309*** 
(0.000) 
0.461*** 
(0.000) 
0.674*** 
(0.000) 
1.000   
ΔGDP -0.139** 
(0.025) 
0.234*** 
(0.000) 
-0.294*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.757) 
-0.076 
(0.224) 
0.051 
(0.415) 
1.000  
NPL 0.367*** 
(0.000) 
-0.186*** 
(0.003) 
-0.093 
(0.136) 
0.177*** 
(0.004) 
0.024 
(0.702) 
0.172*** 
(0.005) 
-0.097 
(0.119) 
1.000 
Non-Listed Banks         
LLP 1.000 
 
       
LOAN -0.007 
(0.864) 
1.000       
SIZE -0.002 
(0.966) 
-0.205*** 
(0.000) 
1.000      
CAR 0.073* 
(0.089) 
0.078* 
(0.068) 
-0.271*** 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFEER 0.417*** 
(0.000) 
0.149*** 
(0.005) 
-0.128*** 
(0.003) 
0.141*** 
(0.001) 
1.000    
EBTP 0.248*** 
(0.000) 
0.072* 
(0.090) 
0.153*** 
(0.000) 
0.169*** 
(0.000) 
0.227*** 
(0.000) 
1.000   
ΔGDP -0.056 
(0.193) 
0.260*** 
(0.000) 
-0.253*** 
(0.000) 
0.129*** 
(0.002) 
0.063 
(0.141) 
0.046 
(0.277) 
1.000  
NPL 0.407*** 
(0.000) 
-0.094** 
(0.027) 
-0.153*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.959) 
0.127*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022 
(0.601) 
-0.037 
(0.391) 
1.000 
Big 4 Banks         
LLP 1.000 
 
       
LOAN 0.083** 
(0.036) 
1.000 
 
      
SIZE -0.017 
(0.665) 
-0.236*** 
(0.000) 
1.000      
CAR 0.174*** 
(0.000) 
0.131*** 
(0.001) 
-0.206*** 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFEER 0.497*** 
(0.000) 
0.174*** 
(0.000) 
-0.118*** 
(0.002) 
0.323*** 
(0.000) 
1.000    
EBTP 0.488*** 
(0.000) 
0.121*** 
(0.002) 
0.047 
(0.234) 
0.315*** 
(0.000) 
0.523*** 
(0.000) 
1.000   
ΔGDP -0.105*** 
(0.008) 
0.233*** 
(0.000) 
-0.331*** 
(0.000) 
0.064 
(0.105) 
-0.058 
(0.141) 
-0.015 
(0.702) 
1.000  
NPL 0.406*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096** 
(0.015) 
-0.132*** 
(0.001) 
0.044 
(0.262) 
0.079** 
(0.045) 
0.084** 
(0.033) 
-0.015 
(0.697) 
1.000 
Non-Big 4 Banks         
LLP 1.000 
 
       
LOAN -0.049 
(0.527) 
1.000       
SIZE -0.045 
(0.563) 
-0.178** 
(0.022) 
1.000      
CAR 0.063 
(0.423) 
0.012 
(0.875) 
-0.420*** 
(0.000) 
1.000     
CFEER 0.236*** 
(0.002) 
0.113 
(0.146) 
-0.132* 
(0.089) 
0.148* 
(0.057) 
1.000    
EBTP 0.084 
(0.281) 
0.245*** 
(0.002) 
0.212*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.977) 
-0.102 
(0.189) 
1.000   
ΔGDP -0.019 
(0.807) 
0.342*** 
(0.000) 
-0.169** 
(0.029) 
0.183** 
(0.019) 
0.179** 
(0.020) 
0.186** 
(0.017) 
1.000  
NPL 0.388*** 
(0.000) 
-0.221*** 
(0.004) 
0.036 
(0.643) 
0.053 
(0.499) 
0.159** 
(0.039) 
-0.045 
(0.562) 
-0.191** 
(0.013) 
1.000 
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Table 4: Bank Income Smoothing: Main Results 
Regressions are estimated using the Panel least square. White’s robust standard error correction is applied. All bank-level variables remain as previously 
defined. EBTP is the income smoothing variable. LISTED take the value ‘1’ if the bank is listed and ‘0’ otherwise. BIG4 take the value ‘1’ if the bank is 
audited by a Big 4 auditor, otherwise, ‘0’. LISTED*EBTP measure the extent that listed banks use provisions to smooth income relative to non-listed banks. 
BIG4*EBTP measure whether there is a significant difference in the income smoothing behavior of African banks with Big 4 auditor relative to banks with 
non-Big 4 auditor. BIG4*LISTED*EBTP measure whether provisions-based income smoothing is significantly associated with African banks that are listed 
and have Big 4 auditor relative to African banks that are not listed and without Big4 auditor. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * 
indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Variables Exp. 
Sign 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
c  -0.005 
(-1.08) 
-0.005 
(-1.15) 
-0.009* 
(-1.69) 
-0.009* 
(-1.78) 
-0.003 
(-0.65) 
-0.003 
(-0.71) 
-0.009* 
(-1.88) 
-0.010** 
(-2.01) 
EBTP + 0.164*** 
(3.31) 
0.162*** 
(3.28) 
0.114 
(1.57) 
0.111 
(1.54) 
0.075 
(1.55) 
0.070 
(1.46) 
0.042 
(1.00) 
0.036 
(0.88) 
LOAN +/- 0.00003 
(1.14) 
0.00005* 
(1.72) 
0.00003 
(0.99) 
0.00004 
(1.55) 
0.00003 
(1.25) 
0.00005* 
(1.82) 
0.00003 
(1.15) 
0.00005* 
(1.67) 
NPL + 0.0007*** 
(4.71) 
0.0007*** 
(4.74) 
0.0007*** 
(4.94) 
0.0007*** 
(4.98) 
0.0007*** 
(4.74) 
0.0007*** 
(4.77) 
0.0007*** 
(4.89) 
0.0007*** 
(4.94) 
CAR - -0.00004 
(-0.48) 
-0.00005 
(-0.61) 
-0.00002 
(-0.23) 
-0.00003 
(-0.36) 
-0.00004 
(-0.54) 
-0.00006 
(-0.68) 
-0.00002 
(-0.21) 
-0.00003 
(-0.34) 
SIZE + 0.00009 
(0.39) 
0.00009 
(0.36) 
0.0006** 
(2.00) 
0.0006** 
(2.01) 
-0.030*** 
(-2.76) 
0.0001 
(0.50) 
0.0007** 
(2.19) 
0.0007** 
(2.26) 
CFEER + 0.237*** 
(4.22) 
0.236*** 
(4.20) 
0.202*** 
(3.21) 
0.202*** 
(3.21) 
0.228*** 
(4.02) 
0.227*** 
(4.01) 
0.203*** 
(3.38) 
0.203*** 
(3.42) 
ΔGDP - -0.0004** 
(2.10) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.71) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.85) 
-0.0003 
(-1.48) 
-0.003 
(0.10) 
-0.0004 
(-1.58) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.80) 
-0.0003 
(-1.39) 
BIG4 ?     -0.003 
(-1.16) 
-0.003 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.002 
(-0.56) 
BIG4*EBTP -     0.102 
(1.38) 
0.105 
(0.44) 
0.084 
(0.89) 
0.087 
(0.94) 
LISTED ?   -0.009*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.30) 
 
 
 -0.011*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.64) 
LISTED*EBTP +   0.168* 
(1.66) 
0.169* 
(1.68) 
 
 
 0.330*** 
(2.66) 
0.338*** 
(3.64) 
LISTED*BIG4*EBTP ?       -0.169 
(-1.43) 
-0.175 
(-1.49) 
Period Fixed Effect?  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R²  41.69 42.23 44.06 44.57 41.83 42.39 44.31 44.85 
F-Statistic  83.65 37.96 71.79 37.14 65.65 34.07 54.63 32.33 
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Table 5: Bank Income Smoothing for Four Subsamples 
Regressions are estimated using Panel least square. All regression include White’s robust standard error correction. All bank-level variables remain as 
previously defined. EBTP is the income smoothing variable. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
Variable Exp. Sign Listed Banks Non-Listed Banks Big-4 Banks Non-Big4 Banks 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
c  -0.026** 
(-2.53) 
-0.026** 
(-2.49) 
-0.010 
(-1.36) 
-0.010 
(-1.42) 
-0.008 
(-1.64) 
-0.009* 
(-1.72) 
0.007 
(0.74) 
0.007 
(0.63) 
EBTP + 0.389*** 
(6.69) 
0.388*** 
(6.48) 
0.099 
(1.55) 
0.097 
(1.51) 
0.165*** 
(2.98) 
0.163*** 
(2.96) 
0.075 
(1.63) 
0.071 
(1.55) 
LOAN +/- 0.00009** 
(2.49) 
0.0001** 
(2.49) 
-0.00005 
(-0.22) 
0.00001 
(0.37) 
0.00005 
(1.52) 
0.00007** 
(2.09) 
-0.00002 
(-0.33) 
-0.00001 
(-0.11) 
NPL + 0.0006*** 
(3.46) 
0.0006*** 
(3.13) 
0.0007*** 
(3.79) 
0.0007*** 
(3.87) 
0.0008*** 
(4.36) 
0.0008*** 
(4.39) 
0.0004** 
(2.29) 
0.0005** 
(2.17) 
CAR - -0.0002 
(-0.82) 
-0.0002 
(-0.74) 
0.00004 
(0.46) 
0.00003 
(0.31) 
-0.00007 
(-0.65) 
-0.0001 
(-0.91) 
-0.00002 
(-0.30) 
-0.00001 
(-0.22) 
SIZE + 0.001*** 
(2.79) 
0.001*** 
(2.64) 
0.0005 
(1.16) 
0.0004 
(1.16) 
0.0003 
(1.06) 
0.0003 
(1.09) 
0.0007** 
(2.19) 
-0.0004 
(-0.54) 
CFEER + 0.052 
(0.74) 
0.054 
(0.72) 
0.311*** 
(4.16) 
0.307*** 
(4.11) 
0.258*** 
(3.74) 
0.260*** 
(3.78) 
0.113** 
(2.06) 
0.122** 
(2.08) 
EBTP + 0.389*** 
(6.69) 
0.388*** 
(6.48) 
0.099 
(1.55) 
0.097 
(1.51) 
0.165*** 
(2.98) 
0.163*** 
(2.96) 
0.075 
(1.63) 
0.071 
(1.55) 
ΔGDP - -0.0009*** 
(3.16) 
-0.0008** 
(-2.57) 
-0.0003 
(-1.12) 
-0.0003 
(-0.86) 
-0.0005** 
(-1.97) 
-0.0004 
(-1.41) 
-0.0004 
(-0.12) 
-0.00008 
(-0.27) 
Period Fixed 
Effect? 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R²  65.43 64.79 33.29 33.47 45.02 45.77 16.56 14.07 
F-Statistic  70.74 30.68 40.21 18.29 76.22 34.92 5.68 2.69 
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Table 6: Interactions for EBTP and LISTED in four subsamples 
Regressions are estimated using the Panel least square. All regression include White’s robust standard error correction. All bank-level variables remain as previously 
defined. EBTP is the income smoothing variable. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively 
Variable Exp. Sign Listed Banks Non-Listed Banks Big 4 Banks Non-Big 4 Banks 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
c  -0.035** 
(-2.47) 
-0.037** 
(-2.58) 
-0.009 
(-1.36) 
-0.009 
(-1.41) 
-0.015** 
(-2.32) 
-0.016** 
(-2.46) 
0.006 
(0.57) 
0.004 
(0.44) 
EBTP + 0.610* 
(1.69) 
0.636* 
(1.74) 
0.057 
(1.50) 
0.052 
(1.37) 
0.121 
(1.48) 
0.119 
(1.46) 
0.051 
(1.19) 
0.048 
(1.13) 
LOAN +/- 0.00009** 
(2.54) 
0.0001*** 
(2.66) 
-0.00003 
(-0.10) 
0.00001 
(0.47) 
0.00005 
(1.46) 
0.00007** 
(1.97) 
-0.00003 
(-0.50) 
-0.00002 
(-0.33) 
NPL + 0.0006*** 
(3.39) 
0.0006*** 
(3.08) 
0.0007*** 
(3.73) 
0.0007*** 
(3.80) 
0.0008*** 
(4.36) 
0.0008*** 
(4.39) 
0.0005*** 
(3.23) 
0.0005*** 
(3.02) 
CAR - -0.0002 
(-0.83) 
-0.0002 
(-0.74) 
0.00004 
(0.43) 
0.00002 
(0.27) 
-0.00004 
(-0.37) 
-0.00007 
(-0.63) 
-0.00004 
(-0.72) 
-0.00004 
(-0.63) 
SIZE + 0.002*** 
(2.91) 
0.002*** 
(2.94) 
0.0005 
(1.16) 
0.0005 
(1.17) 
0.0009** 
(2.56) 
0.0009*** 
(2.65) 
-0.0003 
(-0.39) 
-0.0002 
(-0.24) 
CFEER + 0.069 
(0.98) 
0.073 
(0.96) 
0.304*** 
(4.36) 
0.299*** 
(4.31) 
0.235*** 
(3.19) 
0.237*** 
(3.26) 
0.083* 
(1.89) 
0.093* 
(1.90) 
ΔGDP - -0.0008*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0007** 
(-2.35) 
-0.0003 
(-1.14) 
-0.0002 
(-0.86) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0003 
(-1.22) 
-0.00004 
(0.12) 
-0.00002 
(-0.07) 
BIG4  0.004 
(0.29) 
0.004 
(0.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
    
BIG4*EBTP - -0.224 
(-0.59) 
-0.251 
(-0.66) 
0.051 
(0.59) 
0.055 
(0.64) 
    
LISTED      -0.010*** 
(-3.41) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.015 
(-1.27) 
-0.015 
(-1.28) 
LISTED*EBTP +     0.146 
(1.37) 
0.146 
(1.38) 
0.432 
(1.09) 
0.443 
(1.11) 
Period Effect?  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R²  65.77 65.28 33.16 33.35 47.44 48.09 18.72 16.35 
F-Statistic  56.09 27.95 31.32 16.29 65.47 34.09 5.22 2.79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Table 7: Country-Specific Regression 
Pooled Regression with White’s robust standard error correction. Sample banks in Algeria, Cameroun, Ethiopia and Senegal did not report data for 
CAR. 
Country c EBTP LOAN NPL CAR SIZE CFEER ΔGDP Adj R² F-stat 
Algeria 0.013 
(0.82) 
0.035 
(0.92) 
-0.0001*** 
(-4.31) 
0.0001 
(0.59) 
- -0.001 
(-1.01) 
-0.248*** 
(-3.77) 
0.003*** 
(13.21) 
72.0 7.87 
Angola 0.023 
(0.41) 
0.178 
(1.15) 
-0.00005 
(-1.25) 
0.0005*** 
(13.40) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0009 
(-0.27) 
-0.398 
(-1.34) 
0.0003 
(0.74) 
41.9 2.24 
Botswana 0.038** 
(2.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.21) 
0.0008*** 
(2.91) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.002** 
(-2.21) 
-0.096 
(-0.85) 
-0.00001 
(-0.15) 
81.92 18.47 
Cameroun 0.091*** 
(3.62) 
0.463*** 
(3.31) 
-0.00001 
(-0.06) 
0.001*** 
(4.03) 
 -0.009*** 
(-6.06) 
-0.138 
(-1.41) 
0.004*** 
(4.32) 
80.2 
 
18.54 
Egypt -0.014 
(-0.91) 
0.047 
(0.50) 
0.0001*** 
(3.48) 
0.0002** 
(2.13) 
-0.0001 
(-1.14) 
0.0006 
(0.75) 
-0.266 
(-0.96) 
0.002*** 
(3.39) 
25.8 
 
2.34 
Ethiopia 0.011 
(1.18) 
0.295** 
(2.61) 
0.00008** 
(2.14) 
0.0005*** 
(2.92) 
- -0.002*** 
(-4.29) 
0.116 
(0.98) 
-0.0002 
(-0.35) 
49.1 5.66 
Ghana 0.023 
(1.66) 
0.015 
(0.37) 
0.000004 
(0.02) 
-0.00006** 
(-1.94) 
-0.00005 
(-1.15) 
-0.002 
(-1.59) 
-0.048 
(-0.53) 
0.00001 
(0.07) 
-0.2 0.38 
Kenya -0.005 
(-1.04) 
0.006 
(1.06) 
0.00001 
(1.15) 
0.00001 
(0.59) 
0.00004 
(1.24) 
0.0003 
(1.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
0.00004 
(0.41) 
3.7 1.78 
Mauritius 0.001 
(0.29) 
0.012 
(0.66) 
0.00002 
(1.23) 
0.0002* 
(1.79) 
-0.00005 
(-0.10) 
-0.0001 
(-0.31) 
-0.152 
(-0.84) 
0.0003 
(0.98) 
9.2 1.76 
Morocco 0.031 
(1.42) 
-0.236** 
(-1.96) 
-0.00009 
(-1.58) 
0.0009 
(1.44) 
0.00007 
(0.14) 
-0.002* 
(-1.62) 
0.612** 
(2.35) 
-0.0008*** 
(-3.24) 
65.1 8.20 
Namibia 0.004 
(1.00) 
0.146* 
(1.78) 
-0.00001 
(-0.21) 
-0.00006 
(-0.67) 
0.00006 
(0.69) 
-0.0005 
(-1.57) 
-0.093 
(-1.15) 
0.0002* 
(1.79) 
25.7 3.37 
Nigeria -0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
-0.00003 
(-0.38) 
0.002 
(0.87) 
0.00005 
(0.11) 
-0.004 
(-1.06) 
-0.039 
(-0.29) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
0.1 1.03 
Senegal -0.018 
(-0.69) 
0.288* 
(1.77) 
-0.000004 
(-0.09) 
-0.0002 
(-0.66) 
- 0.001 
(0.50) 
0.057 
(0.84) 
0.0007 
(1.61) 
13.5 2.12 
South 
Africa 
0.016 
(1.15) 
0.077 
(1.26) 
0.00001*** 
(2.93) 
-0.00003 
(-0.26) 
-0.0007 
(-1.46) 
-0.0006 
(-1.03) 
0.049 
(1.03) 
-0.0005 
(-0.89) 
18.3 5.49 
Tanzania 0.023 
(1.44) 
0.103 
(1.33) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.45) 
0.0009*** 
(5.99) 
0.00005 
(0.21) 
-0.002* 
(-1.79) 
0.093 
(1.35) 
0.0002 
(0.25) 
35.2 8.54 
Togoa -0.180* 
(1.98) 
-2.019 
(-0.62) 
0.0005 
(0.86) 
0.003* 
(1.73) 
-0.003 
(-1.43) 
0.007 
(1.41) 
4.429 
(0.89) 
0.003 
(0.88) 
41.6 1.92 
Tunisia 0.021 
(0.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
-0.00001 
(-0.17) 
0.0002 
(0.58) 
0.0004 
(1.51) 
-0.002 
(-0.77) 
-0.102 
(-0.26) 
0.0005* 
(1.69) 
19.7 2.44 
Uganda 0.008 
(1.35) 
0.038*** 
(2.93) 
0.00003 
(1.34) 
0.0002** 
(2.52) 
-0.00002 
(-0.25) 
-0.0009* 
(-1.86) 
0.049 
(1.07) 
0.0002 
(0.93) 
1.1 1.14 
Zambia 0.006 
(0.26) 
0.035 
(0.47) 
-0.00001 
(-0.05) 
-0.0002 
(-1.13) 
0.0002 
(1.05) 
-0.002 
(-0.89) 
0.089 
(1.02) 
0.002*** 
(2.67) 
28.7 2.55 
aNote: the regression estimation for Togo do not include fixed effect due to the small bank sample. Pooled regression is used instead.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
